The capital structure adjustment through debt financing based on various macroeconomic conditions in Korean market  by Kim, Hyun Jung et al.
155
Investigación Económica, vol. LXXIV, núm. 294, octubre-diciembre de 2015, pp. 155-172.
The capital structure adjustment 
through debt ęnancing based on various 
macroeconomic conditions in Korean market*
Hyun Jung Kima ȡ Pando Sohna ȡ Ji-Yong Seoa,b
Abstract
We investigate the relationship between the capital structure and the economic condi-
tions in Korean market. To Ànd the adjustment behavior on capital structure depending 
on macroeconomic conditions, we use dynamic partial adjustment model to estimate 
adjustment speeds toward targets. As the data analyzed in the study, we use non-Ànancial 
Àrms listed in the Korean stock exchange. Through the empirical test, we Ànd evidence 
that is consistent with Hackbarth, Miao and Morellec (2006) and Cook and Tang (2010)’s 
arguments that Àrms tend to adjust faster their leverage toward target level in economic 
expansion. Thus, our Àndings support to the pecking order and market timing theories in 
terms of  corporate Ànance theories on capital structure. In addition, our test results are 
re-conÀrmed with robust consistency even though we include year dummy variable in the 
empirical test model for controlling global Ànancial crisis in contrast with Kim (2013).
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Resumen
En este trabajo investigamos la relación entre la estructura de capital y las condiciones 
económicas en el mercado coreano. Para conocer el comportamiento de ajuste de la es-
tructura de capital respecto a las condiciones macroeconómicas, utilizamos un modelo 
de ajuste parcial dinámico que estima las velocidades de ajuste hacia los objetivos. Los 
datos analizados en el estudio corresponden a las empresas no Ànancieras que cotizan 
en la bolsa de valores de Corea. Empíricamente encontramos evidencia que es consis-
tente con los argumentos de Hackbarth, Miao y Morellec (2006) y Cook y Tang (2010),  
respecto a que las empresas tienden a ajustar más rápidamente su apalancamiento res-
pecto al nivel objetivo durante la expansión económica. Por lo tanto, nuestros resultados 
apoyan las teorías de pecking order y de market timing en términos de las teorías de Ànan-
zas corporativas relativas a la estructura de capital. Además, los resultados de nuestras 
pruebas son consistentemente robustos a pesar de que incluimos en nuestro modelo 
una variable Àcticia ligada al tiempo como mecanismo de control de la crisis Ànanciera 
global, en contraste con Kim (2013).
Palabras clave: comportamiento de ajuste, condiciones macroeconómicas, modelo 
dinámico de ajuste parcial, teorías de pecking order y de market timing.
IћѡџќёѢѐѡіќћ
Korajczyk and Levy (2003) have suggested target capital structure as the func-
tion of  economic conditions and Àrm characteristics. Based on the results 
from Korajczyk and Levy (2003), we postulate that economic conditions have a 
signiÀcant effect on debt and equity issuance in Àrms with Ànancial constraints 
rather than in Àrms without Ànancial constraints. Thus, we infer that economic 
conditions and a Àrm’s characteristics may result in variability, and that also this 
variability differentially affects capital structure. Even though there are some 
studies on the relationship between security issuing and economic condition 
like Hackbarth, Miao and Morellec (2006) and Cook and Tang (2010) for North 
America Àrms, it is hard to Ànd the previous studies analyzed with the sample 
data of  Korean Àrms.
Especially, Korea is one of  core countries among many emerging countries 
and we think that the empirical result on Korean Àrms plays a benchmark role 
in inferring from the debt Ànancing behavior of  other emerging countries. As 
the reason why we study on Korean Àrms’ debt Ànancing behavior, we can suggest 
that Korean Àrms have experienced rapidly growth and undergone bailout for 
Asian Ànancial crisis in 1997 as a typical economic cataclysm case to understand 
the mechanism between debt Ànancing behavior and economic condition.
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In domestic research with the sample data of  Korean Àrms, our paper is 
relatively similarity to Kim and Shin (2011) in terms of  research theme. Kim 
and Shin (2011) analyze the effects of  macroeconomic conditions on the ad-
justment speed of  capital structure without any manager’s behavior of  debt 
Ànancing like over and under leverage depending on macroeconomic conditions. 
However, we use different model and control variables. As the other previous 
studies dealt with the relationship between economic factor and capital structure, 
there are Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) and Lee et al. (2010). Choe, Masulis, 
and Nanda (1993) suggest the positive association between equity issues and 
various business cycles, and Lee et al. (2010) provide the persistence behavior 
of  capital structure determinants. 
Meanwhile, this study based on the conceptual ideas of  Kim (2013), unpub-
lished dissertation, is tested mainly on the relationship between economic condi-
tions and Ànancial decisions on capital structure using Korean Àrms. Unlike the 
research methodology of  Kim (2013), we re-analyze the theme with regression 
model including year dummy variables for controlling global Ànancial crisis to 
conÀrm robustness of  test results of  Kim (2013). 
The remainder of  this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents 
theoretical backgrounds on traditional capital structure theories and the recently 
related literatures, and Section 3 contains a description of  the empirical test 
model through derivation procedure. In section 4, the basic statistic and the 
description of  used data are discussed, and in section 5, empirical test results 
are shown. Finally, the conclusion is provided in section 6.
Tѕђќџђѡіѐюљ яюѐјєџќѢћёѠ
Traditionally, some theories on capital structure in the Àeld of  Ànance include 
trade-off  theory, pecking order theory, and market timing theory. To analyze 
the impact of  a determinant factor on capital structure, we have to review the 
concept of  introduced theories. 
First, trade-off  theory focuses on Ànancing selection depending on trade-
off  between beneÀts and costs, and this trade-off  leads to target leverage as 
suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Stulz (1990), and Hart and Moore 
(1995). Adjustment behavior toward target leverage may continue to quickly 
adjust deviation from target leverage if  adjustment cost does not occur. Recently, 
Graham and Harvey (2001) is line with trade-off  theory by suggesting that most 
Àrms have a rigid debt-to-equity ratio as their target capital structure.
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Second, pecking order theory argues that Àrms invest with internal funds, 
and then tend to use debt and equity sequentially as suggested by Myers and 
Majluf  (1984). According to pecking order theory, the adjustment speed to tar-
get leverage is very slow, or there is no target leverage because a Àrm does not 
have incentive to adjust to target leverage. Like the studies of  Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers (1999), Fama and French (2002), Baker and Wurgler (2002), Welch 
(2004), Hovakimian (2006), and Flannery and Rangan (2006), they suggest that 
pecking order theory is much better than trade-off  theory in terms of  explain-
ing capital structures with time-series patterns. 
Third, market timing theory in capital structures, suggested by Baker and 
Wurgler (2002), indicates the accumulated result from previous forecasts on 
market. There is no optimal structure, and market evaluation continuously af-
fects capital structure.
However, the research trends that economic conditions play a pivotal role in 
determining capital structure is frequently introduced in that it can be changed 
with time and a Àrm’s characteristics follows. 
Leary and Roberts (2005) provide the evidence to show that Àrms try to 
adjust the gap between target leverage and real one. Alti (2006) asserts that 
market timing shock related with initial public offerings (IPO) activity on leverage 
disappears after two. As recent study for the South African market, Ezeoha and 
Botha (2012) investigate debt issues for Àrms with varying ages and collateral 
value. Especially, Hackbarth, Miao and Morellec (2006) suggest models to ana-
lyze the affect of  economic conditions on capital structure selection in terms 
of  dynamic perspective. Under dynamic adjustment of  capital structure, Àrms 
tend to quickly adjust their capital structure toward target one during expansion 
rather than recession. The suggestion of  Hackbarth, Miao and Morellec (2006) 
was reconÀrmed by Cook and Tang (2010) who asserts that there are positive 
relationships between business cycles and the adjustment speed of  capital struc-
ture. Erel et al. (2012) also suggest that economic conditions encourage Àrms 
to issue equity. Thus, Àrms that are reluctant to issue securities are susceptible to 
information if  a recession does not abate; instead, Àrms tend to issue convert-
ible bonds when equity is issued leading to increasing debt. 
Tѕђ ѓџюњђѤќџј ќѓ ђњѝіџіѐюљ њќёђљ
We use empirical test model derived by two partial adjustment models which 
are the second stage partial adjustment model and integrated dynamic partial 
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adjustment model. Based on Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), the sec-
ond stage partial adjustment model is to analyze capital structure issues. One 
advantage of  this model is that target leverage changes can be gleaned because 
they occur over time and can be based on a Àrm’s characteristics. We suggest 
the estimation of  the speed of  adjustment as follows.
Considering the methodology of  Cook and Tang (2010), we estimated tar-
get leverage through regression using equation [1]. During the second stage, 
we estimated the speed of  adjustment using target leverage through the Àrst 
stage by considering Kayhan and Titman (2007) and Cook and Tang (2010). 
The following equation [1] is set up as the Àrst stage for the estimation of  
target leverage. In equation [1], EconomyCond is economy condition, and we 
estimate target leverage (Lev*) using the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator 
method (QMLE) by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). The method is to solve bias, 
which occurs in linear model estimation, with a fractional dependent variable. 
In equation [1], we expect that Àrms would quickly adjust their capital structure 
to target one in the perfect market with no adjustment cost as suggested by 
Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001). Thus, we postulate that Àrms would 
partially re-adjust their capital structure toward the level they want if  there is 
adjustment cost.
Lev EconomyCond Xi t t i t,
*
,= + G B1 1 [1]
In the second stage, we use the standardized partial adjustment model by Hova-
kimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), which is as follows. In equation [2], Q is the 
ratio deviated from the target leverage from t-1 to t. The meaning that Q equals 
1 indicates that Àrms perfectly adjust their capital structure toward their target 
level. However, adjustment cost exists if  Q is below 1. Flannery and Rangan 
(2006) Ànd that the speed of  adjustment is abnormally smaller than expected 
if  the target leverage derived from the Àrst stage equation is used in the sec-
ond stage. We include the partial adjustment effect and Àxed effects into the 
integrated dynamic partial adjustment model to catch the affect of  economic 
conditions on the speed of  adjustment.
Lev Lev Lev Lev ei t i t i t i t i t, , ,
*
, ,( ) =  + 1 1Q [2]
Equation [3] is designed for integrated dynamic partial adjustment model. 
In equation [3], the leverage of i Àrm at time t can be presented as the linear 
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function of  a set of  economic conditions with time lag 1, EconomyCondt–1, 
and Àrm characteristics Xt–1. To derive equation [3], we included equation [1] 
into equation [2]. We estimate the speed of  adjustment for economic condi-
tions by separating them into expansion and recession periods without includ-
ing time effects because economic variables have time-varying effects.
Lev Lev X EconomyCond ei t i t t t i t, , ,( )=  + + +  1 1 1 1Q B G [3]
BюѠіѐ ѠѡюѡіѠѡіѐ юћё ёђѠѐџіѝѡіќћ ќѓ ёюѡю
We use the sample data of  non-Ànancial Àrms listed in the Korean stock ex-
change from 1990 to 2010. To consider manufacturing Àrms in private sectors, 
we exclude Àrms in the public sector, including electricity and gas Àrms. We also 
exclude workout Àrms and Àrms with an impaired capital. Our data sources 
were FnGuide and KisValue, Korean Ànancial databases. 
Table 1 shows the deÀnitions of  used variables. We use two types of  leverage. 
Book-value leverage (Book leverage) is calculated as equation [4]. In equation 
[4], SD + LD is the summation of  short-term and long-term debt at time t, 
and TA means the total assets in terms of  Book-value leverage. Meanwhile, 
Market-value leverage (Market leverage) is estimated using equation [5]. In 
equation [5], SD + LD is the summation of  short-term and long-term debt. 
S and P indicate outstanding numbers of  stock and stock price, respectively, 
which is used to calculate the market value of  equity. 
BL
SD LD
TAi t
i t i t
i t
,
, ,
,
=
+
[4]
ML
SD LD
SD LD S Pi t
i t i t
i t i t i t i t
,
, ,
, , , ,
=
+
+ + [5]
As plausible Àrm characteristic determinants, we adopt variables used in the 
studies of  Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), Fama and French (2002), and 
Flannery and Rangan (2006). As previous studies suggested, the determinants 
are market-to-book ratio (MB), asset tangibility (Tangibility), earnings before 
interests and taxes (Cash Áow), depreciation and amortization (Depreciation), 
Àrm size (Size), research and development (R and D), research and develop-
ment dummy (R and D dummy), and sales and expense (SE).
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Table 1
Deęnition of variables
Variables Deęnition
Book leverage SD + LD means the summation of short-term and long-term debt, and TA indicates the total assets in terms of 
book-value leverage in the following formula: BL
SD LD
TA

 .
Market leverage SD + LD means the summation of short-term and long-term debt, and SP indicates outstanding number of stock 
and stock price, respectively in the following formula: ML SD LD
SD LD SP


 
.
MB It is a proxy variable for ęrm’s growth, and the formula for calculation is as follows. It is adopted based on 
Flannery and Rangan (2006): (Total debts + Market value of equity) ÷ Total assets.
Tangibility It is estimated as the ratio of non-liquid assets to total assets as follows. It is adopted the previous study of 
Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and Tehranian (2004): Non-current asset ÷ Total assets.
Cash Ěow It is a proxy variable for cash Ěow as following formula: Earning before interests and taxes (ђяіѡ) ÷ Total assets.
Depreciation It is recognized as the accounting item with non-cash out Ěow, and is regarded as the ęrm characteristics vari-
able for enjoying the tax-shield eěect in corporate ęnance: (Depreciation + Amortization) ÷ Total assets.
Size As a proxy variable of ęrm size, it is estimated by adding a natural logarithm to the total assets as follows. It 
is adopted based on Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and Tehranian (2004): Ln(Total 
assets).
R and D It is a proxy variable for ęrm uniqueness, and it is estimated as follows: R and D ÷ Total assets.
R and D dummy It is dummy variable for another uniqueness of ęrm: 1 or 0 if R and D exists or otherwise.
SE As a uniqueness of ęrm, the ratio of sales expense to total sales is adopted: Selling and administrative expense 
÷ Total revenue.
Over-leverage It is variable to estimate current leverage eěect compared with target one, 1 or 0 if observed leverage at specięc 
time is over-levered, thus ( ), ,
*Lev Levi t i t  >1 1 0, or otherwise. 
Term spread As the proxy variable for the 1st economic condition, the diěerence between 10-year T-bond rate and 1-year 
T-bill rate is adopted.
Default spread As the proxy variable for the 2
nd economic condition, the diěerence between BBB grade corporate bond rate and 
AAA grade corporate bond rate is adopted.
єёѝ growth As the 3rd variable for economic condition, єёѝ rate is additionally adopted.
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MB is the ratio of  market value for the total assets that represent a Àrm’s 
growth. In terms of  pecking order theory, Flannery and Rangan (2006) suggested 
that a high MB limits leverage and increases investment opportunities.
Tangibility is a Àrm’s tangible assets, and is estimated as the ratio of  non-liquid 
assets to total assets. According to Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and Tehranian 
(2004), we expect that Àrms with higher tangibility have the security capacity 
to borrow funds, and have low cost of  bankruptcy. 
Cash Áow is estimated as the ratio of  earnings before interests and taxes 
to total assets. It is used as the proxy variable for cash Áow. It is expected that 
Àrms with high cash Áow tend to have low leverage. 
Depreciation is the ratio of  depreciation to total assets. It is not for out-cash 
Áow, and it is expected that Àrms with high depreciation and amortization tend 
to have less leverage to enjoy the tax-shield. 
Size is estimated by adding a natural logarithm to the total assets that rep-
resent Àrm size. According to Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Hovakimian, 
Hovakimian, and Tehranian (2004), Àrms tend to increase leverage because of  
high accessibility to the Ànancial market. It is expected that Àrms with a high 
Àrm size have low-cash Áow volatility and Ànancial distress. 
Considering Titman (1984) and Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and Tehranian 
(2004), we adopt the proxy variables for Àrm uniqueness, such as R and D, SE, 
and R and D dummy. R and D is calculated as the ratio of  research and devel-
opment to total assets, and R and D dummy is 1, or 0, if  R and D is available 
within a Àrm. SE is calculated as the ratio of  sales expense to total sales. Based 
on previous research results, we expected that Àrms with a high R and D and SE 
would tend to maintain low leverage to protect them from Ànancial distress.
To control industry characteristics, which cannot be observed by independent 
variables, we use the median industry debt from Korean Standard Industrial 
ClassiÀcation (KSIC) and Korean Stock Exchange ClassiÀcation (KSEC) to clas-
sify each industry. Furthermore, we add the Over-leverage into the model to 
conÀrm current leverage levels compared with target leverage. Over-leverage 
is a dummy variable, which represents 1, or 0, when a Àrm is over-levered at a 
speciÀc time.
Meanwhile, we use some economic variables like Term spread, Default 
spread, and Gross Domestic Product growth (GDP growth) rate to Ànd out the 
affect of  economic factors on the speed of  adjustment on capital structure.
First of  all, Term spread is calculated as the difference between 10-year T-
bond rate and 1-year T-bill rate. Based on Dotsey (1998), high spread indicates 
 The capital structure adjustment through debt ęnancing        163
that economic conditions may be booming. Thus, we expect that the speed 
of  adjustment on capital structure might progress quickly when there is an 
economic boom. 
Default spread is deÀned as the difference between the average rate of  re-
turn on BBB-grade corporate bonds and average rate of  return on AAA-grade 
corporate bonds according to Korajczyk and Levy (2003) and Cook and Tang 
(2010). We expect that default spread would be high at the recession period, 
and vice versa. Thus, it is expected that Àrms would quickly adjust their capital 
structure when default spread was low rather than high.
We also adopt the GDP growth rate as the proxy variable for economy con-
ditions. We expect that the speed of  adjustment on capital structure would be 
quicker in economic expansion than in economic recession. 
Additionally, we need to consider a current leverage level compared with 
the target leverage. Thus, we analyze over-levered, or un-levered, effects. In 
terms of  pecking order theory, we consider a possibility that Àrms with low 
leverage will quickly adjust their capital structure more than over-levered Àrms 
because the former prefers to issue new debts rather than issue new equity. 
In addition, we need to check the plausible argument of  Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) in terms of  market timing theory that Àrms are reluctant to issue equity 
when the stock-price is low. However, Àrms can issue new debt to adjust capital 
structure to target one when a Àrm has low leverage.
Table 2 shows a basic statistic for Àrm characteristics and economy variables. 
According to the Table 2, the means of  book-value leverage and market-value 
leverage among Àrm characteristics variables are 0.5323 and 0.5743, respectively. 
In addition, the means of  term spread and default spread in the economic 
variables are 0.0081 and 0.0311, respectively.
Table 3 suggests the Pearson correlation between leverage and economy 
variables. The relation between leverage and GDP growth is signiÀcantly positive 
at 1% regardless of  book-value or market-value leverage. However, the relation 
between leverage and spread (i.e., term spread and default spread) is negatively 
signiÀcant at 1% regardless of  book-value or market-value leverage. 
Eњѝіџіѐюљ ѡђѠѡ џђѠѢљѡѠ
We estimate how the speed of  adjustment on capital structure was different 
depending on the economic conditions. 
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Table 2
Basic statistic of ęrm characteristics and economic variables
Variables Mean Median Standard deviation
Minimum 
value
Maximum 
value Observations
Panel A: ęrm characteristics variables
Book leverage 0.5323 0.5248 0.2621 0.0412 5.7727 7 090
Market leverage 0.5743 0.5955 0.2248 0.0108 0.9986 7 090
MB 0.9862 0.9128 0.5493 0.2163 28.6782 7 090
Tangibility 0.5398 0.5408 0.1571 0.0543 0.9361 7 090
Cash Ěow 0.0998 0.0971 0.0793 –0.8904 0.9082 6 708
Depreciation 0.0038 0.0024 0.0046 0.0000 0.0665 7 050
Size 19.0337 19.0337 1.3730 14.5188 25.1779 7 090
R and D 0.0127 0.0052 0.0638 –0.0034 4.8253 6 127
SE 0.1521 0.1079 0.1554 0.0081 5.1123 7 090
Panel B: Economic variables
1-year T-bill rate 0.0803 0.0545 0.0454 0.0291 0.1768 7 090
10-year T-bond rate 0.0884 0.0686 0.0433 0.0420 0.1861 7 090
AAA grade corporate 
bond rate 0.0917 0.0705 0.0434 0.0441 0.1889 7 090
BBB grade corporate 
bond rate 0.1141 0.1068 0.0293 0.0819 0.1930 7 090
єёѝ growth 0.0533 0.0580 0.0357 –0.0570 0.1070 7 090
Term spread 0.0081 0.0063 0.0063 0.0004 0.0226 7 090
Default spread 0.0311 0.0302 0.0176 0.0017 0.0602 7 090
Table 3
Correlation between leverage and economic condition
Book 
leverage
Market 
leverage
Term
spread
Default
spread
єёѝ
growth
Market leverage 0.735 
(< 0.0001)
Term spread –0.181 –0.092 
(< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
Default spread –0.271 –0.120 0.724 
(< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
єёѝ growth 0.153 0.059 –0.438 –0.679 
(< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
Note: ( ) indicates p-value. 
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Table 4 shows the result of  the speed of  adjustment on capital structure 
depending on term spread. At the booming period, the speeds of  adjustment 
are 0.348 (=1 – 0.652) and 0.507 (= 1 – 0.493) for book-value leverage and 
market-value leverage, respectively. The speeds of  adjustment in book-value 
leverage and market-value leverage are 0.387 (= 1 – 0.613) and 0.532 (= 1 – 0.468) 
during the recession period. We know that the speed of  adjustment during the 
recession period was faster than that at the booming period. These results do 
not align with our expectations, which were based on Korajczyk and Levy (2003) 
that the speed of  adjustment would be faster in the economy expansion than 
in the economy recession. 
We note on Àrm characteristic determinants, Cash Áow and R and D dummy. 
The coefÀcient values of  Cash Áow are all signiÀcantly negative regardless of  
using book-value leverage and market-value leverage. As we expected, it con- 
Àrms that Àrms with a high proÀtability per 1 unit of  asset maintains a low-
leverage level because of  increasing retained earnings. The coefÀcient values of  
R and D dummy are all signiÀcantly negative regardless of  the type of  lever-
age and economic condition. As we expected, the Àrms with R and D dummy 
tend to lower their leverage to protect themselves from Ànancial distress. This 
evidence is aligned with the results of  Titman (1984) and Hovakimian, Hova-
kimian, and Tehranian (2004). 
In Over-book leverage and Over-market leverage current leverage effects, 
all the coefÀcient values are signiÀcantly positive. However, we suggest that all 
speeds of  adjustment were faster than those of  Book leverage(t–1) and Market 
leverage(t–1). In the light of  this evidence, we understand that Àrms tend to adjust 
capital structure with faster speed because of  over-levered conditions.
Table 5 shows the result of  speed of  adjustment depending on default spread 
instead of  term spread. However, the speeds of  adjustment are 0.439 (= 1 – 0.561) 
and 0.528 (= 1 – 0.472) in the economy expansion period using book-value 
leverage and market-value leverage. The speeds of  adjustment for book-value le-
verage and market-value leverage are 0.379 (= 1 – 0.621) and 0.514 (= 1 – 0.486) 
in the economic recession period. The speed of  adjustment in the economic 
expansion is faster than in the recession period. These results are in line with 
our expectations. Therefore, default spread is suitable as a proxy variable for 
the economic condition.
Regarding Àrm characteristics determinants, the variables that show con-
sistency for signiÀcance and coefÀcients regardless of  type of  leverage and 
economic condition are Cash Áow and Size. The coefÀcient values of  Àrm size 
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are all signiÀcantly positive regardless of  the type of  leverage and economy 
condition, which was as we expected. It is line with Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
and Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and Tehranian (2004). Therefore, we conÀrm 
that bigger Àrms tend to increase leverage levels because of  low-cash Áow 
volatility and high accessibility to capital market. 
Meanwhile, as far as Over-market leverage is concerned, its coefÀcient value 
is signiÀcantly positive. Therefore, we conÀrm that the speeds of  adjustment 
are faster than that of  Market leverage(t–1) in cases using market-value leverage. 
Firms tend to adjust capital structure with faster speeds because of  over-levered 
conditions when market-value leverage is used. 
Throughout the above test results, our major Àndings are consistent with 
those of  Hackbarth, Miao and Morellec (2006) and Cook and Tang (2010) 
analyzing with the data of  North America Àrms.
CќћѐљѢѠіќћ
We examine how the speed of  adjustment on capital structure depends on eco-
nomic conditions for nonÀnancial Àrms listed in the Korean stock exchange. Even 
though the results on the speed of  adjustment according to the type of  economy 
conditions are different, we can suggest that the evidence obtained from default 
spread aligns with our expectations based on the previous studies. Therefore, we 
think that default spread is a suitable proxy variable for economic conditions.
Our academic contributions through this research are to conÀrm that the 
speed of  adjustment on capital structure is different depending on the type 
of  economy condition, and to suggest suitable proxy variables for economy 
conditions. Our study posits signiÀcant evidence on the speed of  adjustment 
on capital structure, supporting the result of  Hackbarth, Miao and Morellec 
(2006) that the speed of  adjustment is faster in economic expansions than in 
economic recessions. Even though our study includes the year dummy variable 
for controlling global Ànancial crisis, the test result is re-conÀrmed because of  
robust consistency in terms of  signiÀcances and directions of  coefÀcients in 
comparison with Kim (2013). As a result, we can assert that this study supports 
pecking order and market timing theories. 
However, our paper has some limitations which are needed to extend time 
series. In addition, we need to compare the evidences from domestic market 
data with those of  international market to make our main Àndings generalized. 
Thus, we leave it as new research topic.
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Table 4
Regression results according to economic condition based on Term Spread
Book leverage Market leverage
Expansion Recession Total Expansion Recession Total
Intercept –0.034 –0.096*** –0.081*** 0.012 –0.002 –0.006
(–1.48) (–5.04) (–5.43) (0.34) (–0.12) (–0.42)
Book leverage(t–1) 0.652*** 0.613*** 0.623***
(44.41) (50.58) (64.47)
Market leverage(t–1) 0.493*** 0.468*** 0.478***
(38.06) (38.75) (52.13)
Terms structure 0.346 –1.411*** –0.612** 1.165*** –3.902*** –0.818**
(0.95) (–3.23) (–2.17) (2.67) (–8.02) (–2.53)
MB 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.015*** –0.062*** –0.058*** –0.061***
(4.53) (5.00) (7.01) (–13.13) (–16.56) (–20.72)
Tangibility –0.001 –0.004 –0.006 0.034*** –15.761 0.006
(–0.16) (–0.56) (–0.65) (2.56) (–0.97) (0.95)
Cash Ěow –0.223*** –0.194*** –0.203*** –0.166*** –0.217*** –0.197***
(–10.91) (–11.38) (–15.62) (–6.77) (–11.13) (–12.86)
Depreciation –0.196 –0.231 –0.244 –0.936** –0.312 –0.553**
(–0.51) (–0.81) (–1.06) (–2.24) (–0.96) (–2.11)
R and D 0.003 0.017 0.016 –2.113 0.023* 0.022
(0.04) (1.35) (1.32) (0.07) (1.64) (1.54)
R and D dummy –0.010** –0.011** –0.013*** –0.012** –0.013** –0.012***
(–1.92) (–2.37) (–2.96) (–1.93) (–2.24) (–2.87)
SE –0.003 –0.016 –0.012 –0.001 –0.049*** –0.032***
(–0.25) (–1.53) (–1.26) (–0.05) (–3.77) (–3.08)
Size 0.003 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.003* 0.007*** 0.008***
(1.25) (4.43) (4.61) (1.76) (7.26) (7.42)
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Book leverage industry median 0.242*** 0.332*** 0.315***
(10.68) (25.14) (27.05)
Market leverage industry median 0.297*** 0.304*** 0.301***
(18.96) (27.13) (32.72)
Over-book leverage 0.076*** 0.101*** 0.090***
(6.81) (11.55) (13.34)
Over-market 
leverage 0.141*** 0.193*** 0.186***
(8.79) (21.12) (24.51)
Over-book leverage * Book leverage(t–1) 0.065*** 0.034*** 0.045***
(3.32) (2.13) (3.74)
Over-market leverage * Market leverage(t–1) 0.046** –0.003 –0.002
(2.11) (–0.11) (–0.31)
Good economy dummy –0.008** –0.013*
(–2.42) (–1.81)
Good economy dummy * Book leverage(t–1) –0.002*
(–1.83)
Good economy dummy * Market leverage(t–1) –0.012*
(–1.80)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.887 0.889 0.886 0.886 0.881 0.881
F-value 1 102*** 1 908*** 2 642*** 1 103*** 1 789*** 2 480***
Note: ***, **, and * are signięcant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 4, continuation…
Book leverage Market leverage
Expansion Recession Total Expansion Recession Total
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Table 5
Regression results according to economic condition based on Default Spread
Book leverage Market leverage
Expansion Recession Total Expansion Recession Total
Intercept –0.086** –0.094*** –0.103*** –0.081* –0.154*** –0.163***
(–2.35) (–5.63) (–6.70) (–1.83) (–7.62) (–8.75)
Book leverage(t–1) 0.561*** 0.621*** 0.621***
(23.34) (58.12) (66.22) 0.472*** 0.486*** 0.494***
Market leverage(t–1) (20.97) (49.90) (54.01)
Default 0.013 –0.405*** –0.375*** 3.514*** –1.065*** –0.917***
(0.03) (–4.65) (–4.47) (8.15) (–9.90) (–8.84)
MB 0.015** 0.015*** 0.015*** –0.093*** –0.056*** –0.061***
(2.32) (5.97) (6.75) (–12.34) (–16.92) (–19.85)
Tangibility –0.045*** 0.002 –0.003 –0.026 0.003 0.001
(–2.59) (0.25) (–0.54) (–1.52) (0.32) (–0.03)
Cash Ěow –0.261*** –0.192*** –0.204*** –0.182*** –0.213*** –0.206***
(–7.60) (–13.25) (–15.51) (–4.71) (–12.04) (–12.83)
Depreciation –0.026 –0.274 –0.192 0.605 –0.395 –0.246
(–0.05) (–1.02) (–0.83) (1.16) (–1.27) (–0.85)
R and D 0.025** –0.058 0.016 –0.012 0.012 –0.022
(2.01) (–0.92) (1.26) (–0.71) (0.11) (–1.31)
R and D dummy –0.004 –0.012*** –0.008*** 0.008 –0.013** –0.007*
(–0.63) (–2.58) (–2.62) (1.04) (–2.47) (–1.71)
SE –0.004 –0.002 –0.003 –0.057 –0.021 –0.025
(–0.23) (–0.25) (–0.46) (–2.20) (–1.95) (–2.45)
Size 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.014***
(2.77) (5.14) (5.85) (7.45) (13.79) (15.76)
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Book leverage industry median 0.372*** 0.316*** 0.334***
(14.31) (23.47) (28.24)
Market leverage industry median 0.196*** 0.347*** 0.337***
(6.64) (35.13) (36.13)
Over-book leverage –0.003 0.093*** 0.086***
(–0.16) (12.65) (12.61)
Over-market leverage 0.101*** 0.201*** 0.196***
(5.19) (23.95) (25.05)
Over-book leverage * Book leverage(t–1) 0.171*** 0.052*** 0.054***
(4.97) (3.54) (4.41)
Over-market leverage * Market leverage(t–1) 0.062** –0.024* –0.023*
(1.96) (–1.76) (–1.71)
Good economy dummy 0.017* 0.039***
(1.81) (3.75)
Good economy dummy * Book leverage(t–1) –0.053***
(–3.42)
Good economy dummy * Market leverage(t–1) –0.077***
(–4.93)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.8579 0.8819 0.8878 0.8519 0.8781 0.8717
F-value 447*** 2 328*** 2631*** 428*** 2 245*** 2 267***
Note: ***, **, and * are signięcant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 5, continuation…
Book leverage Market leverage
Expansion Recession Total Expansion Recession Total
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